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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-
102 (1953). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Whether the Second Judicial District Court ("District Court") erred in 
granting partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff Commercial Real Estate 
Investment, L.C. ("CRE") and denying the motion for partial summary judgment of 
Comcast of Utah II, Inc. ("Comcast") with respect to the issufe of the enforceability of the 
liquidated damages provision set forth in Article 9.02 of the Building Lease Agreement 
dated July 17, 1995 (the "Lease") executed by and between CRE and TCI Cablevision of 
Utah ("TCI") and in awarding CRE damages in the amount of $3,760,553.14, which 
amount includes an award of $1,739,612.50 in liquidated damages, interest on the 
liquidated damages award in the amount of $2,008,540.54, late fees in the amount of 
$8,400.00, and attorneys' fees in the amount of $4,000.00. The District Court's ruling is 
reviewed for correctness, with no deference given to the decision of the District Court. 
Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452,456 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). This 
issue was preserved in the District Court. (R. 481-90.) 
II. Whether the District Court erred in determining that the liquidated damages 
in the amount of $1,739,612.50 awarded to CRE pursuant to Article 9.02 of the Lease, 
which, with interest, late fees, and attorneys' fees as specified in the Lease, resulted in a 
total judgment in favor of CRE in the amount of $3,760,553114, represent a reasonable 
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forecast of just compensation for the harm, if any, caused by TCFs failure to 
continuously operate the leased premises, despite having continuously paid all rents when 
due. The District Court's ruling is reviewed for correctness, with no deference given to 
the decision of the District Court. Baird, 781 P.2d at 456. This issue was preserved in 
the District Court. (R. 484-88.) 
III. Whether the District Court erred in determining that the harm caused by 
TCFs failure to continuously operate the leased premises is one that is incapable or very 
difficult of accurate estimation. The District Court's ruling is reviewed for correctness, 
with no deference given to the decision of the District Court. Baird, 781 P.2d at 456. 
This issue was preserved in the District Court. (R. 488-90.) 
IV. Whether the District Court erred in determining the propriety of the 
liquidated damages awarded to CRE based on principles of unconscionability. The 
District Court's ruling is reviewed for correctness, with no deference given to the 
decision of the District Court. Baird, 781 P.2d at 456. This issue was preserved in the 
District Court. (R. 481-84.) 
V. Whether the District Court erred in refusing to consider CRE's undisputed 
failure to mitigate its alleged losses in granting judgment in the amount of $3,760,553.14 
to CRE. The District Court's ruling is reviewed for correctness, with no deference given 
to the decision of the District Court. Baird, 781 P.2d at 456. This issue was preserved in 
the District Court. (R. 686-87.) 
VI. Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law by applying the rule for 
enforceability of liquidated damages set forth in Section 339 of the Restatement (First) of 
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Contracts, as opposed to Section 356 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981), 
which states: 
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the 
agreement but only at an amount that is reasonable in the light 
of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and the 
difficulties of proof of loss. A term fixing unreasonably large 
liquidated damages is unenforceable on ground^ of public 
policy as a penalty. 
The District Court's ruling is reviewed for correctness, with no deference given to the 
decision of the District Court. Baird, 781 P.2d at 456. This i&sue was preserved in the 
District Court. (R. 482-83.) 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations 
that are determinative of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASH 
A. The Nature of the Case. 
This case arises from a punitive liquidated damages provision present in a lease 
agreement that TCI, predecessor in interest to Comcast, negotiated and entered into with 
CRE on or about July 17, 1995. TCI agreed to lease the entife premises of real property 
owned by CRE located at 5125 South 1500 West, Riverdale, Utah (the "Property"). The 
Lease had an initial term of fifteen years. Pursuant to the Le^se, TCI began operating its 
business from the Property in 1995 and continued to do so uifitil TCI vacated the premises 
on approximately July 17, 2001. Comcast, TCFs successor in interest, located a 
subtenant who began occupying the Property on February 22, 2006. TCI and Comcast 
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have paid all rent when due for the entire duration of the Lease, including the period that 
the Property was unoccupied. 
Despite having been paid in full for all monthly rents when due for the entire 
duration of the Lease, CRE claims that it is entitled to a windfall in the form of liquidated 
damages, which, combined with the interest penalty imposed by the Lease, amount to 
more than triple the monthly rent for the period that neither TCI nor the subtenant 
occupied the Property. However, the liquidated damages provision set forth in the Lease 
is unenforceable because it resulted in an award that is grossly disproportionate to the 
actual injury, if any, sustained by CRE, and because the liquidated damages provision is 
otherwise unenforceable under Utah law. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
On July 16,.2004, CRE filed its complaint against Comcast, seeking an award of 
liquidated damages plus interest and other penalties as specified in the Lease. CRE filed 
a motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the enforceability of the liquidated 
damages provision on July 26, 2007. Comcast filed a cross-motion for partial summary 
judgment with respect to that same issue on August 1, 2007. 
On October 10, 2008, the District Court entered an order granting CRE's motion 
and denying Comcast's motion. On September 15, 2009, the District Court entered 
judgment in favor of CRE in the amount of $3,760,553.14, which amount includes an 
award of $1,739,612.50 in liquidated damages, plus interest on the liquidated damages in 
the amount of $2,008,540.54, late fees in the amount of $8,400.00, and attorneys' fees in 
the amount of $4,000.00. 
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C. Statement of Facts. 
1. CRE is a Utah limited liability company in the business of developing real 
estate in northern Utah. (R. 705.) 
2. CRE is the owner of the Property located at 5125 South 1500 West, 
Riverdale, Utah. The Property consists of a commercial office building, which is 
approximately 30,000 square feet, and an associated parking and yard area. CRE 
developed the Property for the specific purpose of leasing it. j(R. 705.) 
3. CRE's loan commitment for construction of thq Property was 
$1,850,000.00, to be repaid over 15 years with monthly amortized payments of 
$17,679.57. Other than this loan, CRE presented no evidence concerning development 
costs for the Property. (R. 705.) 
4. In 1995, TCI approached CRE about developing a large commercial 
building ("the TCI Building") where TCI could operate its northern Utah cable television 
business. The TCI Building was intended to encompass a customer service center, a call 
center, a depot from which TCI could dispatch its fleet of maintenance and installation 
vehicles, and facilities for TCF s other business operations ii^  northern Utah. TCFs 
proposal to CRE was that it would find a site in Weber County and design a building for 
the site which would meet TCFs specific needs. TCI also proposed that if CRE would 
purchase the desired site and construct the TCI Building on the site to TCFs 
specifications, TCI would enter into a long-term lease on the site and the TCI Building. 
(R. 705.) 
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5. CRE was willing to entertain TCFs proposal and the parties commenced 
discussions about an agreement. TCI chose a site for the proposed building, and CRE 
reviewed and accepted the site. The proposed site was a lot in a large commercial and 
industrial subdivision near Riverdale Road and 1-15. Most of the other lots in the 
subdivision were undeveloped. (R. 705-706.) 
6. Unbeknownst to TCI, CRE allegedly anticipated that TCFs headquarters 
would drive additional development in the subdivision, and therefore obtained another lot 
adjacent to the TCI lot. However, CRE admits it never expressed its intentions regarding 
the development of this lot to TCI. (R. 706.) 
7. TCFs agent prepared a commercial lease containing boilerplate terms and 
delivered the draft lease to CRE. The draft lease TCI prepared contained virtually all of 
the terms that were included in the final signed lease between the parties.1 The draft 
lease contained blanks for the rental amounts and the term of the lease because the parties 
had not yet reached an agreement regarding these provisions. (R. 212-234, 718.) 
8. The draft lease contained a provision requiring TCI to operate its business 
in the building continuously for the term of the lease. The draft lease also included a 
For purposes of the parties' summary judgment motions only, Comcast did not 
dispute CRE's factual allegations concerning, among other things, the manner in which 
the Lease was negotiated, as such facts are not relevant to the legal question of whether 
the liquidated damages provision is enforceable. These "facts," which Comcast 
preserved the right to dispute for all other purposes, are recited here because the District 
Court relied upon them erroneously in its rulings. 
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liquidated damages provision requiring TCI to pay liquidated damages in the event that 
TCI did not operate the building continuously. (R. 718.) 
9. CRE reviewed the terms contained in the draft l^ase and approved them. 
The Lease, executed on July 17, 1995, was for a fifteen-year term with rental amounts 
that would escalate every five years. For the first five years ot the Lease, the rental 
amount was $10.79 per square foot. The monthly rent for the| site for this period was 
$26,975. For years six through ten of the Lease, the rental aihount was $12.21 per square 
foot, or $30,535 per month. In years eleven through fifteen, $ie rent was and continues to 
be $13.74 per month or $34,350 per month. (R. 718-19.) 
10. Rent was not based on a percentage of TCFs s^les or profits. The total base 
rent to be paid over the term of the Lease is $5,510,000.00. (ft. 719.) 
11. Under the Lease, TCI agreed "to operate all of ihe Building continuously 
during the entire term of this Lease with due diligence and efficiency." TCI was to keep 
sufficient personnel at the Building to conduct its business " # all times." (Lease Tf 9.01; 
R. 217, 719.) 
12. The Lease further stated that: 
As liquidated damages for the failure of Tenant to comply with the 
terms of this Article and in addition to all other remedies Landlord 
may have hereunder, Landlord shall have the right, at its option, to 
collect not only the minimum and additional rent herein provided, 
but added rent at the rate of one- thirtieth (1/30T) of the minimum 
monthly rent set forth in Article 4 for each anc^  every day that Tenant 
shall fails [sic] to conduct its business as required herein. 
(Lease «f 9.02; R. 217-18, 719.) 
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13. In addition, the Lease specifies that past-due amounts are subject to a 
$150.00 one time late fee and that interest on past-due amounts is to be charged at one-
and-three-quarters percent (1.75%) per month. (Lease f 31 (a); R. 231.) 
14. There is no evidence in the record that the parties had any substantive 
discussion as to the reasons, if any, for the inclusion of the liquidated damages provision 
in the Lease or that the parties had any discussions as to the type or amount of the 
damages, if any, that the parties anticipated would result if TCI were to vacate the 
premises before the termination of the Lease. (R. 208, 718, 722.) 
15. The Property consists of a stand-alone office building in a largely 
undeveloped area. (R. 430,497, 552-61.) 
16. After the commencement of the Lease, TCI took possession of the building 
and began operating from the building. (R. 719.) 
17. On or about July 17, 2001, TCI ceased operations at the site. (R. 719.) 
18. In 2002, Comcast acquired TCI and succeeded to TCFs interest in the 
Property and the Lease and to its obligations under the terms of the Lease. Comcast 
listed the Property for rent with a real estate agent in an effort to locate a replacement 
tenant. (R. 719.) 
19. CRE did nothing to assist in finding a new tenant other than to refer 
inquiries to Comcast's agent. (R. 719, 723.) 
20. A substitute tenant was finally found and took possession of the Property 
pursuant to a sublease dated February 22, 2006. (R. 719.) 
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21. It is undisputed that the presence of a subtenant bn the Property constitutes 
operation of the Property for the purposes of the Lease. (R. 719-20.) 
22. Comcast and TCI have paid all rent due under tfye Lease since its inception, 
but did not pay any liquidated damages to CRE on the basis that the liquidated damages 
provision contained in the lease is unenforceable. Liquidated damages from July 17, 
2001, through February 22, 2006, total $1,739,612.50. Interest on this amount through 
May 31, 2009 at the rate set forth in the Lease totals $2,008,540.54. (R. 720, 743-44.) 
23. On July 16, 2004, CRE filed its complaint against Comcast, seeking 
payment of amounts owed under the liquidated damages provision plus interest as 
specified in the Lease. (R. 1-37.) 
24. CRE filed its motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the issue 
of the enforceability of the liquidated damages provision set forth in the Lease on July 26, 
2007. (R. 162.) 
25. Comcast filed its cross-motion for partial sumnjiary judgment with respect 
to that same issue on August 1, 2007. (R. 359.) 
26. In connection with the parties' cross-motions for partial summary judgment 
on the enforceability of the liquidated damages provision, Cpmcast also argued that CRE 
was not entitled to recover all or part of any liquidated damages CRE sought on the 
ground that CRE failed to mitigate its damages. (R. 371-72, 477-78, 723-24.) 
27. As a part of its motion for partial summary judgment, CRE submitted an 
appraisal report stating that the damages it suffered as a result of TCP s failure to 
continuously operate the leased premises totaled $680,000.00. (R. 264-312.) 
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28. Comcast submitted an appraisal with its motion stating that the damages 
suffered by CRE, which may have been zero, in a worst-case scenario would have totaled 
no more than $120,000.00. (R. 492-574.) 
29. On October 10, 2008, the District Court entered an order granting CRE's 
motion and denying Comcast's motion. (R. 716-26.) 
30. On September 15, 2009, the District Court entered judgment in favor of 
CRE in the amount of $3,760,553.14, which amount includes an award of $1,739,612.50 
in liquidated damages pursuant to Section 9.02 of the Lease, interest on the liquidated 
damages in the amount of $2,008,540.54 pursuant to Section 31(a) of the Lease, late fees 
in the amount of $8,400.00 also pursuant to Section 31(a) of the Lease, and attorneys' 
fees in the amount of $4,000.00 pursuant to Section 30 of the Lease. (R. 743-44.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The District Court erred in entering judgment based on the liquidated damages 
provision. Damages available for a breach of contract are strictly compensatory in 
nature. It is wholly inappropriate for damages to be awarded that represent a windfall 
bearing no relationship to actual damages or for damages to be awarded that punish for a 
breach rather than compensate the non-breaching party for an injury. The windfall 
received by CRE is rendered all the more egregious by the fact that TCI and Comcast 
have paid all rent when due for the duration of the Lease, and CRE was awarded 
liquidated damages despite having already enjoyed the benefit it bargained for (i.e, 
collection of rents) in entering into the Lease. The liquidated damages awarded to CRE 
are, on their face, a penalty because they are grossly disproportionate to CRE's actual 
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damages. Utah law requires a liquidated damages provision t0 be voided when it results 
in an award that is grossly disproportionate to the actual damages sustained. However, 
the District Court enforced the liquidated damages provision, even while acknowledging 
that there was a dispute of fact as to the amount of CRE's actual damages, which may 
have been zero. Utah Courts have long recognized that a crucial issue in determining the 
enforceability of a liquidated damages provision is the actual damages resulting from a 
breach, and it was error for the District Court to enter judgment in the presence of an 
acknowledged factual dispute as to CRE's actual damages. 
Under Section 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts ("Section 339"), 
which Utah has adopted as the standard for enforceability of a liquidated damages 
provision, a liquidated damages provision cannot be enforce^ unless the amount of 
liquidated damages represents "a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm" 
resulting from a breach, and "the harm that is caused by the breach is one that is 
incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation." The Distrjict Court erred in applying 
Section 339 to this case because it incorrectly concluded that the more than double rent 
provided for by the liquidated damages provision represented a reasonable forecast of just 
compensation. The District Court did this despite its own acknowledgement that the 
record was devoid of any evidence as to the types or amount of any damage anticipated 
by the parties at the time the Lease was negotiated. The District Court improperly 
applied circular reasoning, concluding that the parties must Have anticipated damages 
simply based on the fact that they had entered into a liquidated damages provision. This 
represents an erroneous application of Section 339. 
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The District Court also erred in applying the second part of the test set forth in 
Section 339. The damages that could have resulted from TCTs failure to operate the 
Property are of a type that is easily calculated. The District Court, however, erroneously 
held that the elements of the doctrine of unconscionability must be present for a 
liquidated damages provision to be voided under the second prong of Section 339. No 
Utah appellate court, however, has held that the elements of unconscionability are in any 
way determinative of a liquidated damages provision's enforceability under Section 339. 
While the liquidated damages provision in this case should be voided under 
Section 339 and existing Utah case law, Utah law could be substantially clarified through 
the adoption of Section 356 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) ("Section 
356"), which states: 
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated but only at an 
amount that is reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual loss 
caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss. A term 
fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is unenforceable on 
the grounds of public policy as a penalty. 
This provision of the Second Restatement was adopted for the explicit purpose of 
bringing the Restatement standard for enforceability of a liquidated damages provision in 
harmony with the Uniform Commercial Code standard that applies to contracts for the 
sale of goods. Utah, like forty-eight of its sister states and the District of Columbia, has 
already adopted an almost identical standard with respect to contracts for the sale of 
goods. Five states have already adopted Section 356, and numerous other states have 
adopted similar standards. Adopting Section 356 would clarify Utah law substantially, 
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and bring harmony to Utah case law which has previously ma4e inconsistent statements 
with respect to the role actual loss plays in assessing liquidated damages. 
Finally, it was undisputed in the District Court that CRE made no attempt to 
mitigate its damages. Under Utah law, a landlord has an obligation to mitigate its 
damages by attempting to locate a substitute tenant. CRE made no such effort, choosing 
instead to reap a windfall by allowing liquidated damages to accrue. The District Court's 
judgment should be reversed because the District Court erroneously refused to consider 
any impact of CRE's undisputed failure to mitigate or to allov^ Comcast an opportunity to 
prove that CRE's undisputed failure to mitigate its damages would reduce or negate any 
damages CRE would otherwise be entitled to recover. The District Court's refusal to 
consider CRE's undisputed failure to mitigate and the resulting award to CRE of punitive 
and excessive liquidated damages against Comcast, who has paid all rent due under the 
Lease, directly contradicts the fundamental public policy underlying the duty to 
mitigate—a public policy that is all the more important during an economic crisis such as 
the one presently confronting Utah, which has resulted in frozen credit markets, dropping 
property values, and increasing rates of lease and mortgage defaults. Thus, the District 
Court's entry of judgment in favor of CRE should be reversefl 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BASED ON AN UNENFORCEABLE LIQUIDATED 
DAMAGES PROVISION. 
A. The Liquidated Damages Provision is an Unenforceable Penalty on Its 
Face. 
The District Court erred in enforcing the liquidated damages provision because the 
damages imposed thereby, which with interest effectively amount to more than triple 
rent, are punitive, rather than compensatory in nature. Damages recoverable for breach 
of contract are those that arise naturally from the breach and are reasonably supposed to 
have been contemplated or foreseen by the parties. Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 625 
(Utah 1982) {citing Pac. Coast Title Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 335 
P.2d 906 (1958)). Damages permitted for a breach of contract are strictly compensatory 
in nature. Id; see also Restatement (Second) Contracts, § 356, cmt. a (1981) ("The 
central objective behind the system of contract remedies is compensatory, not punitive."). 
"The purpose of [contract] damages is to place the nonbreaching party in a position that 
he or she would have been in had the contract been performed, not to provide the 
nonbreaching party with a windfall recovery." Jones v. Hryn Development, Inc., US 
N.E.2d 245, 249 (111. App. Ct. 2002). Utah courts regard liquidated damages provisions 
with suspicion because they do not, as a general rule, approximate compensatory 
damages. Robbins, 645 P.2d at 625. 
The goal of contract damages is to compensate for actual injury, and not to punish 
the breaching party. Contract "[d]amages are properly measured by the amount 
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necessary to place the nonbreaching party in as good a position as if the contract had been 
performed." Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982). As a prominent 
commentator has stated: 
Since the goal is compensation and not compulsion, the promisor 
who could have performed, but chose not to for financial reasons, 
should not be dealt with harshly. Punitive damages should not be 
awarded for breach of contract because they will encourage 
performance when breach would be socially m0re desirable. 
E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts, § 12.3 (3d ed. 2004). Based on these 
principles, punitive damages may not be awarded for a breach of contract. See Cook 
Assocs., Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Utah 1983) ("tt is settled as a general rule 
(subject to exceptions not here pertinent) that a plaintiff cannW recover punitive damages 
for a breach of contract."); Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57, *| 29, 
84 P.3d 1154, 1161 ("[P]unitive damages are recoverable onl^ for torts, not for breach of 
contract.").2 
The Utah Supreme Court "has long had a policy against the imposition of 
liquidated damages that constitute a penalty for breach of a contractual agreement." 
Woodhaven Apts. v. Washington, 942 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1^97). In Perkins v. Spencer, 
243 P.2d 446 (1952), for example, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Even deliberate tortious conduct will not always give rise to punitive damages, 
which "may be awarded only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is 
established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the tortfeasor 
are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that 
manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of 
others." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-8-201 (1953). 
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It will be observed that in all cases where the stipulation for 
liquidated damages was enforced it bore some reasonable relation to 
the actual damages which could reasonably be anticipated at the time 
the contract was made and was not a forfeiture which would allow 
an unconscionable and exorbitant recovery. 
On the contrary, where enforcement of the forfeiture provision 
would allow an unconscionable and exorbitant recovery, bearing no 
reasonable relationship to the actual damages suffered, we have 
uniformly held it to be unenforceable. 
Id. at 449-50. In Reid v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 905 (Utah 1989), the 
Utah Supreme Court opined that: 
Damages recoverable under a liquidated damages provision in a 
contract will generally be limited to an amount that represents a 
reasonable estimation, at the time the contract was drafted, of what 
would be necessary to compensate the nonbreaching party for losses 
caused by the breach. This policy is based on the view that any 
liquidated damages provision not so limited results in the imposition 
of a penalty on the breaching party that is not permitted. 
Woodhaven, 942 P.2d 918, addressed the enforceability of a liquidated damages 
provision stating that in the event a tenant vacated a leased premises before termination, 
the tenant would be subject to a "termination fee" equal to one and one-half months' rent. 
Id. at 919. The trial court and Court of Appeals had both held that the liquidated 
damages provided for were reasonable in light of the anticipated expenses that would be 
caused by the tenant's early termination of the lease. Id. at 922. The Utah Supreme 
Court, however, reversed, observing that the record included no "evidence of the time 
and costs generally required in reletting an apartment early except testimony of the 
manager to the effect that a vacated apartment is normally ready for rerenting in three to 
six days." Id. The Utah Supreme Court held that: 
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To determine if the liquidated damages clause amount has a 
reasonable relationship to the fee, there must at least be some 
evidence of the costs anticipated when the lease was executed. 
Id. Because there was no evidence to establish the time and cost of reletting or the 
relationship of that amount to the liquidated damages provision, the Utah Supreme Court 
concluded that the liquidated damages award amounting to one and one-half months' rent 
was an unenforceable penalty. Id. at 922-23. 
Similarly, in Allen v. Kingdon, 723 P.2d 394 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court 
upheld the voiding of a liquidated damages provision contained in an earnest money 
agreement which "provided that the sellers could retain all amounts paid by the buyers as 
liquidated . . . damages in the event buyers failed to complete! the purchase." Id. at 397. 
The trial court had held that the $10,800.00 liquidated damages award was grossly 
disproportionate and excessive because the only recoverable actual damages the sellers 
had sustained amounted to $3,746.00. Id. at 391. The Utah Supreme Court agreed, 
finding the $10,800.00 award "excessive and disproportionate when compared to the 
$3,746 loss of bargain suffered by the sellers." Id. The Utafy Supreme Court further 
stated: 
Where . . . the amount of liquidated damages bears no reasonable 
relationship to the actual damage or is so grossly excessive so as to 
be entirely disproportionate to any possible loss that might have 
been contemplated that it shocks the conscience, the stipulation will 
not be enforced. 
Id. (quoting Warner v. Rasmussen, 704 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah 1985)). 
Utah courts have refused to enforce liquidated damages provisions far less 
punitive than the provision at issue in this case. In Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082 (Utah 
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1983), for example, the Utah Supreme Court considered a real estate purchase contract 
that purported to allow the seller to retain, as liquidated damages, all payments made by 
the buyer in the event of a breach. In refusing to enforce the liquidated damages 
provision, the Utah Supreme Court held as follows: 
In the present case actual damage and liquidated damage amounts 
are very disproportionate. Liquidated damages of $20,725 do not 
bear a reasonable relationship to $5,895 actual damages. We affirm 
the trial court's conclusion that enforcing the liquidated damages 
provision in this case would result in an arbitrary penalty against the 
buyers which would be grossly excessive and disproportionate to the 
loss sustained by seller. 
M a t 1084. 
In Johnson v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371 (Utah 1977), also concerning a real estate 
purchase contract, the Court ruled that: 
[T]o allow the seller to retain the $34,596.10 paid by buyer when 
seller's actual damages amount to only $25,650.00 would be 
"grossly excessive and disproportionate to any possible loss." Such 
would be to allow seller to retain payments totaling some 34% 
greater than the actual damages determined by the trial court. 
The Restatement of contracts, section 339, cited with approval in 
Perkins v. Spencer, supra, is in accord with this position. 
Id. at 373.3 
As these cases make clear, assessing whether a particular liquidated damages 
provision results in the imposition of a penalty requires the courts to consider the amount 
of the actual damages sustained. If "the liquidated damages are disproportionate to the 
3
 Citing Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446, 447 (Utah 1952) (provision in 
$10,500 real estate purchase contract that down payment of $2,500 would be forfeited if 
purchasers failed to perform held an unenforceable "penalty"). 
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actual compensatory damages sustained, this may be evidence of an unreasonable 
forecast and the provision may be deemed a penalty and not enforced." Reliance Ins. Co. 
v. UtahDept. o/Transp. 858 P.2d 1363, 1367 (Utah 1993); see also Garrett v. Coast & 
S. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 511 P.2d 1197, 1202 (Cal. 1973) ("The characteristic feature 
of a penalty is its lack of proportional relation to the damages which may actually flow 
from failure to perform under a contract."); Orr v. Goodwin, £53 A.2d 1190, 1194 (N.H. 
2008) ("[I]t is proper to look at the actual damages suffered in determining whether the 
amount [of liquidated damages] is reasonable."). 
Pyramid Ctr. & Co. Ltd. v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 663 N. Y.S.2d 711 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1997) addressed a liquidated damages provision remarkably similar to that at issue in this 
case. In Pyramid Centers, a commercial tenant who had been leasing space in a shopping 
center closed its store prior to the termination of its lease. Id. at 712-713. The lease 
provided that in the event the tenant ceased operation before the termination of the lease, 
the landlord was entitled to recover double the amount of thd fixed monthly rent. Id. In 
rejecting the liquidated damages provision as an unenforceable penalty, Pyramid Centers 
held that the double-rent liquidated damages provision "was intended to coerce 
defendant's performance rather than compensate plaintiffs for defendant's breach" and 
was "an unreasonable penalty, disproportionate to any subsequent loss suffered by 
plaintiffs." Id. at 713. The provision at issue in this case, which with interest amounts to 
more than triple rent, is even more punitive in character. 
In this case, the liquidated damages award, which ampunts to more than double 
rent, bears absolutely no relationship to any possible actual damages that could be 
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claimed by CRE. The damages suffered by CRE, if any, are far less than the potential 
actual damages at issue in Pyramid Centers, which involved the tenant vacating leased 
space in a shopping mall, where a tenant's vacancy can compromise the landlord's entire 
business. Id. at 712-13. 
The award obtained by CRE represents a windfall that is unlawful and contrary to 
the purpose of contract damages. See TruGreen Cos., LLC v. Mower Bros., Inc., 2008 
UT 81, If 23, 199 P.3d 929, 934 (compelling defendant to pay damages in excess of 
plaintiffs losses "could give plaintiff a windfall and penalize the defendant, neither of 
which serves the purpose of contract damages.") (quoting Am. Air Filter Co. v. McNichol, 
527 F.2d 1297, 1300 (3d. Cir. 1975)). As Chief Justice Wolfe stated, concurring in 
Perkins: 
The desire of the courts not to permit the seller to retain an amount 
greatly in excess of damages which he has actually suffered is, of 
course, responsive to the belief that it is inequitable for the seller to 
reap a windfall out of the contract. In contracts, as distinguished 
from torts, damages for breach or default may usually be ascertained 
with a fair degree of accuracy. Consequently, an excess amount, 
markedly above those damages, is in the nature of an enrichment not 
deserved. 
Perkins, 243 P.2d at 479 (Wolfe, C.J., concurring). 
The District Court specifically recognized that there was a dispute of fact as to the 
actual damages, if any, sustained by CRE, and even noted that Comcast had presented 
evidence that CRE had suffered no actual damages. (R. 708.) Under these 
circumstances, the District Court's entry of summary judgment was clear error. This 
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Court has previously held that in the absence of evidence as td actual damages, it was 
improper to sustain a liquidated damages award. Woodhaven, 942 P.2d at 922. 
The liquidated damages awarded in this case represent a windfall grossly 
disproportionate to any actual damages suffered by CRE. CR|E was granted judgment in 
the amount of $3,760,553.14, including an award of $1,739,612.50 in liquidated 
damages, interest on the liquidated damages in the amount of |$2,008,540.54, late fees in 
the amount of $8,400.00, and attorneys' fees in the amount otf $4,000.00. Using CRE's 
disputed estimate of its actual damages, which it claims to bej$680,000.00,4 CRE's 
judgment is more than five and one-half'(5.5) times the amount of its actual damages.5 
Comcast presented evidence establishing that even in a worst] case scenario, CRE's 
damages, if any, could not exceed $120,000.00. (R. 492-5741) Based on this analysis, 
the liquidated damages award in this case is more than fourteen (14) times any actual 
damages CRE could have sustained. Ironically, the liquidated damages award results in 
the rental rate of the vacant Property being three times greater then the rate for the 
Property when occupied.6 On its face, this award is shocking and so grossly excessive as 
4
 CRE's presented its estimate of damages for the fi^st time in the argument 
section of its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial jSummary Judgment, so this 
purported "fact" was not properly presented to the District Court in accordance with Utah 
R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A). (R. 170-74, 203.) Moreover, the "valuation report" relied on by 
CRE is flawed in that it fails to take into account the sublease of the Property. (R. 264-
312.) 
5
 Excluding interest, using the same estimate, it is still more than 2.6 times 
CRE's actual damages. 
6
 An award of treble damages is generally be assumed to be punitive in 
character. Dist Cablevision Ltd. P'ship v. Bassin, 828 A.2dl 714, 727 (D.C. 2003). 
(continued...) 
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to be entirely disproportionate to any damages the parties could reasonably have 
contemplated. The judgment should be reversed. 
B. The District Court Failed to Properly Apply Section 339 In 
Considering the Enforceability of the Liquidated Damages Provision. 
Utah has adopted Section 339 of the Restatement (First) of Contracts as the 
standard for determination of the enforceability of a liquidated damages provision. 
Woodhaven, 942 P.2d at 921. Section 339 states in pertinent part: 
(1) [A]n agreement, made in advance of breach fixing damages 
therefore, is not enforceable as a contract and does not affect the 
damages recoverable for the breach, unless 
(a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable forecast of just 
compensation for the harm that is caused by the breach, and 
(b) the harm that is caused by the breach is one that is 
incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation. 
Restatement (First) of Contracts, § 339. Under current law, a liquidated damages 
provision must meet both prongs of Section 339 to be enforced. Woodhaven, 942 P.2d at 
921. 
1. The Trial Court Erred In Ruling The Liquidated Damages Provision 
Constitutes A Reasonable Forecast Of Just Compensation For The 
Harm. 
To satisfy the first prong, "the amount so fixed [as liquidated damages] must be a 
reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm that is caused by the breach." 
Woodhaven, 942 P.2d at 921 {citingReliance Ins. Co. v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 858 P.2d 
(...continued) 
Several Utah statutes provide for treble damages as a punitive measure. See, e.g., Utah 
Code. Ann. § 38-9-4(3) (1953) (wrongful lien statute), § 78-36-10 (1953) (wrongful 
detainer statute). 
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1363, 1366 (Utah 1993). If liquidated damages are disproportionate to the actual amount 
of compensatory damages, they are an unreasonable forecast ajid an unenforceable 
penalty. Reliance Ins. Co., 858 P.2d at 1367 {citing Young EUc. Sign v. United Standard 
West, 755 P.2d 162, 164 (Utah 1988)). As discussed above, assuming that CRE suffered 
any damages at all as a consequence of TCP s breach, those damages amounted to, at 
most, one-fifth of the liquidated damages award. This award is grossly disproportionate 
to CRE's actual damages and cannot, as a matter of law, represent a reasonable forecast 
of CRE's damages. 
The District Court erred in refusing to consider the significant disparity between 
CRE's actual damages, if any, and the multi-million dollar liquidated damages windfall 
to CRE. While the District Court acknowledged that a "grossly excessive" disparity 
would be a basis for voiding a liquidated damages provision, ^he District Court also 
acknowledged that there was a dispute of facts as to CRE's actual damages, which may 
have, as the District Court specifically noted, in fact, been zero. (R. 709-10.) The 
District Court concluded that the disparity between CRE's a^ual damages and the 
liquidated damages imposed was not "grossly excessive" without making any finding of 
fact as to CRE's actual damages. The actual amount of CRE's actual damages was 
clearly a material fact that should have precluded summary ^dgment. See Woodhaven, 
942 P.2d at 922 (in the absence of evidence of actual damages, liquidated damages could 
not be sustained); Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) (summary judgment appropriate only if" there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and [] the moving p^rty is entitled to a judgment 
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as a matter of law."). Thus, the District Court erred by granting summary judgment on 
the issue of the enforceability of the liquidated damages provision. 
The District Court also erred as a matter of law in ruling that the liquidated 
damages awarded represented a reasonable forecast of just compensation for any damage 
caused by the alleged breach. As the District Court acknowledged, there was no evidence 
in the record as to "why a liquidated damages provision was included or specifically what 
damages it was intended to redress." (R. 710.) The District Court concluded, however, 
that "the parties must have anticipated some damages because otherwise there would be 
no reason for the liquidated damages provision to be included." (R. 711.) The District 
Court's reasoning is circular and entirely incorrect. The mere fact that the parties 
included a liquidated damages provision cannot demonstrate that the damages provided 
for represent a reasonable forecast of just compensation. It is more likely the provision 
resulted from the thoughtless inclusion of unnecessary boilerplate language drawn from 
the real estate's agent's form lease or the provision of an excessively pro-landlord form to 
both parties by an agent who wanted to get a lease in place and commission paid as soon 
as possible. Indeed, if the presence of a liquidated damages provision was alone 
sufficient to meet the first prong of the Section 339 test, Section 339 would be rendered 
meaningless. 
The District Court's erroneous application of Section 339 could have been avoided 
by simply applying this Court's opinion in Woodhaven. In Woodhaven, this Court 
acknowledged that there was insufficient evidence in the record as to the types and 
amount of damages that would be anticipated in the event the lessee vacated the leased 
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space, and reversed the trial court's ruling on that basis. Woodhaven, 942 P.2d at 922-23. 
The Court then looked at the types of possible damages that may have been anticipated 
and concluded that in the absence of evidence on this issue, liquidated damages could not 
be awarded. Id. 
Here, as in Woodhaven, there is no evidence in the recprd to establish that the 
parties contemplated that CRE would suffer any damages if TCI failed to continuously 
occupy the Property, let alone any evidence that such damaged could equal double the 
agreed-upon rent. The only damages that CRE may have suffered are loss of rental 
income (which they ultimately did not suffer, as rent has been paid throughout the 
duration of the lease) and costs related to reletting the Property.7 CRE argued below that 
it had anticipated that TCI would serve as an "anchor tenant" land that it anticipated 
renting nearby lots on that basis. (R. 710.) The District Couijt, however, specifically 
found that no such intentions had ever been brought to the attention of TCI or Comcast, 
and no such intention is manifest in the Lease. (R. 710.) As buch, no damages related to 
CRE's supposed development plans were foreseeable or anticipated by the parties. 
Indeed, the Property is a stand-alone building in a largely undeveloped area. (R. 430, 
497, 552-61.) As a whole, both the record and the Lease are aevoid of any evidence that 
the parties anticipated any damages in the event of breach, let alone any evidence that the 
7
 Given that CRE did not sell or attempt to sell the Property during that period, it 
cannot claim that it was damaged as a result of any diminution in value. 
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parties discussed the types of damages that would result from a breach or the possible 
amount of such damages. 
More than doubling the rent obviously cannot represent a "reasonable forecast of 
just compensation" for damages that the parties could reasonably have anticipated from 
TCFs failure to continuously occupy the Property. Nothing in the record or the Lease 
indicates that the liquidated damages amount relates to anticipated actual or 
consequential damages CRE could suffer. Even assuming that CRE had anticipated 
developing neighboring properties,8 such properties would have their own construction 
and operating costs, neither of which is even remotely contemplated by the liquidated 
damages provision. In any case, it is contrary to logic to assert that such damages, even if 
they existed, could be logically calculated as a multiple of the monthly rent. CRE 
incurred no costs to re-let the Property and has suffered no lost rent. Nor has CRE 
incurred any lost profits. CRE paid $1,850,000.00 to construct the building on the 
Property. (R. 705.) Comcast will pay $5,510,000.00 to CRE over the life of the Lease, a 
substantial return on its investment. (R. 706-07.) Although CRE has suffered no actual 
damages, and has received the full benefit of its bargain under the Lease by being paid all 
rent when due, it nevertheless seeks to recover an enormous windfall of liquidated 
damages—a windfall nearly equivalent to its construction costs for the Property. With 
interest, that windfall amounts to more than double CRE's construction costs. Utah law 
o 
Again, TCI and Comcast were never advised of any adjacent development 
plans, so there could have been no meeting of the minds that such plans would be 
compromised, or result in damage to CRE, in the event of breach. 
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should not tolerate such a result, which represents nothing short of a punishment to a 
punishment to a rent-paying tenant. 
The District Court compounded its error in applying thfe Iirst prong of Section 339 
analysis by adopting the reasoning of the Montana Supreme Court in Arrowhead Sch. 
Dist No. 75 v. Klyap, 79 P.3d 250 (Mt. 2003). The District Court ruled that the 
liquidated damages represented a reasonable forecast of actual damages because "the 
amount of damages varied depending on the length of time the building was occupied." 
(R. 723.) Arrowhead does not support the District Court's ruling, given that Arrowhead 
rejected "reasonableness" as a standard for enforceability of liquidated damages 
provisions as being overly subjective, and instead adopted aniunconscionability standard. 
Arrowhead, 79 P.3d at 259-63. Moreover, the District Court's reasoning is erroneous 
because it reflects a misunderstanding as to how the liquidated damages provision in this 
case operates. While the total amount of the liquidated damages would be affected by 
how long the building was unoccupied, the monthly amount i|emained the same each 
month the building was unoccupied. This multiplication of the rent bears no relationship 
to any damages that could be attributed to a failure to occupy die building. Indeed, the 
result—that a vacant property's rental value is triple that of the same property with a 
tenant present—is absurd, particularly when looked at in the backdrop of the present 
economic crisis, with plummeting property values, mortgage defaults, and difficulties in 
locating good tenants. This would be true regardless of how I long the Property remained 
unoccupied. Even if the liquidated damages in this case hadlbeen incurred for only one 
month, they would still bear no relationship to any possible 4amages that the parties 
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might actually have anticipated. In short, the liquidated damages award is not a 
reasonable forecast of just compensation. 
2. The Alleged Harm Caused by TCPs Failure to Occupy the Property 
Is Not One that Is Incapable of Estimation or Very Difficult to 
Estimate. 
The second prong of Section 339 requires that the harm caused by an alleged 
breach be incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation. Robbins, 645 P.2d at 626; 
Section 339. This requirement is based on the fact that when damages are ascertainable, 
exact damages determined at the time of breach will nearly always be more fair than 
those guessed at by the parties at the time of contracting. Johnson v. Carman, 572 P.2d 
at 373-74. 
In Perkins, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a forfeiture 
provision contained in a real estate purchase contract could be enforced. Perkins, 243 
P.2d at 450-51. Perkins noted that the construction of a liquidated damages provision 
"depends upon an interpretation of the whole instrument in the light of all of the 
circumstances surrounding the transaction." Id. Perkins then analyzed the types of 
damages that could be awarded for breach of a real estate purchase contract, concluding 
that the damages arising from the breach could be easily ascertained, as they consisted 
only of a "decline in the market or loss of an advantageous bargain." Id. at 451. Such 
damages, the Court concluded, were of a type that "could be determined to a high degree 
of certainty." Id. 
As in Perkinsy any damages suffered by CRE may be calculated with a high 
degree of certainty. The only damages that CRE could conceivably incur as a result of 
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Comcast's breach were loss of rents, costs to re-let the premises (CRE actually incurred 
none of these costs), and any diminution of value. These are types of damages that could 
have been estimated at the time of contract formation. 
The District Court acknowledged that the "Lease does not specify the type of 
damages which were anticipated and the court has had difficulty determining whether it 
was possible for the parties to reach an accurate estimate of damages which were 
hypothetical at the time the contract was formed." (R. 724.) Accordingly, the District 
Court should have concluded that there were disputed issues pf fact respecting the issue 
and denied CRE's motion for summary judgment. Instead, the District Court erroneously 
resorted to the doctrine of unconscionability, holding that if the liquidated damages 
provision was not unconscionable, it satisfied the second prong of Section 339. (R. 724-
25.) It is not the doctrine of unconscionability, however, that determines whether a 
liquidated damages provision is unenforceable in Utah. See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Utah 
Dept. of Tramp. 858 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah 1993) ("In determining the validity of a 
liquidated damages provision, this court has adopted section 339 of the Restatement of 
Contracts."). 
Unconscionability, were it present, could obviously present a secondary basis 
upon which a liquidated damages provision could be voided, but no Utah appellate court 
has held a liquidated damages provision must be unconscionable to be voided under 
Section339. Indeed, if this were the rule, Section 339 would be rendered a nullity and the 
doctrine of unconscionability—an entirely separate body of }aw—would govern the 
issue. See Woodhaven, 942 P.2d at 920-25 (separately considering enforceability of a 
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liquidated damages provision under Section 339 and unconscionability); Crown It Serv., 
Inc. v. Koval-Olsen, 782 N.Y.S.2d 708, 712 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (liquidated damages 
provision unenforceable not only if "unconscionable or contrary to public policy," but if 
the amount of liquidated damages is "plainly or grossly disproportionate to the probable 
loss."). 
Although Utah courts addressing liquidated damages provisions have often 
applied unconscionability standards, there is no support in Utah case law for the 
proposition that unconscionability must be present in order to establish that the harm 
caused by an alleged breach is not one that is "incapable or very difficult of accurate 
estimation." See Woodhaven, 942 P.3d at 925 ("[0]ur determination that the [liquidated 
damages] contract provision is unenforceable does not necessarily mean that such 
provision was unconscionable.") CRE even acknowledged in its briefing below that 
"concepts from unconscionability have nothing to do with an analysis under Section339." 
(R. 181.) Because the test is not unconscionability, it makes no difference whether the 
parties were sophisticated business entities or whether the parties bargained for the 
liquidated damages provision. The District Court's award of liquidated damages cannot 
be justified on the grounds that such award was not, in the District Court's opinion, 
unconscionable. 
II. UTAH SHOULD ADOPT THE STANDARD FOR ENFORCEABILITY OF 
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES SET FORTH IN SECTION 356 OF THE 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS. 
Section 356 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1982) ("Section 356") 
states as follows: 
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Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated but only at an 
amount that is reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual loss 
caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss. A term 
fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is unenforceable on 
the grounds of public policy as a penalty. 
Comcast urges this Court to reverse the District Court's judgment and adopt Section 356 
as the standard for enforceability of a liquidated damages provision in this state. 
Adopting Section 356 would clarify Utah law and serve publi^ policy in several respects. 
First, adopting Section 356 would bring Utah's standard for the enforceability of 
liquidated damages in general contracts into harmony with \hp standards set forth in the 
Uniform Commercial Code for the enforceability of liquidated damages provisions in 
contracts involving the sale of goods. The Utah Uniform Commercial Code provides: 
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the 
agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of 
the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties 
of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonf^asibility of otherwise 
obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing ubreasonably large 
liquidated damages is void as a penalty. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-718(l) (1953). Section356 "redrafted" the liquidated damages 
provision "to harmonize with Uniform Commercial Code § 2-718(1)." Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 356 (Reporter's Note) (1981). Thus7 the Utah state legislature 
has already determined that it is good public policy for Utah to adhere to the rule that 
liquidated damages must be reasonable in light of "the anticipated or actual harm caused 
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by the breach" and that "[a] term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as 
a penalty." Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-718(l) (1953).9 
Second, adopting Section 356 would clarify Utah's case law on liquidated 
damages. Section 339 has been the standard in Utah for over fifty years, but Utah cases 
have been inconsistent in its application. As CRE stated below, Utah "courts have not 
applied Section339 in a logical and consistent manner, which leads to inconsistent results 
and makes it difficult for parties to resolve their disputes over liquidated damages without 
litigation." (R. 586.) For example, the District Court's erroneous ruling in this case was 
based in part on the fact that Utah cases have, on occasion, used elements of 
9
 Forty-eight other states and the District of Columbia have also adopted § 2-
718(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code. The only states that have not adopted this 
section are California and Louisiana. Ala. Code § 7-2-718 (2008); Alaska Stat. § 
45.02.718 (2009); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47-2718 (2010); Ark. Code Ann. § 4-2-718 
(2010); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-2-718 (2010); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42A-2-718 (2010); Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 6 § 2-718 (2010); D.C. Code § 28:2-718 (2010); Fla. Stat. § 672.718 
(2010); Ga. Code Ann. § 11-2-718 (2009); Haw. Rev. Stat § 490:2-718 (2009); Idaho 
Code Ann. § 28-2-718 (2010); 810 111. Comp. Stat. § 5/2-718 (2010); Ind. Code § 26-1-2-
718 (2010); Iowa Code § 554.2718 (2010); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 84-2-718 (2010); Ky. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 355.2-718 (2009); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 2-718 (2009); Md. Code 
Ann., Com. Law § 2-718 (2010); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 106, § 2-718 (2010); Mich. Comp. 
Laws Ann. § 440.2718 (2010); Minn. Stat. § 336.2-718 (2010); Miss. Code Ann. § 75-2-
718 (2009); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 400.2-718 (2010); Mont. Code Ann. § 30-2-718 (2009); 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 2-718 (2009); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 104.2718 (2008); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 382-A.-2-718 (2010); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-718 (2010); N.M. Stat. § 55-2-718 
(2010); N.Y. U.C.C. Law § 2-718 (2010); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-2-718 (2009); N.D. Cent. 
Code § 41-02-97 (2009); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1302.92 (2010); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 
12A § 2-718 (2010); Or. Rev. Stat § 72.7180 (2009); 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2718 
(2010); R.I. Gen. Laws § 6A-2-718 (2009); S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-718 (2009); S.D. 
Codified Laws § 57A-2-718 (2009); Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2-718 (2010); Tex. Bus. & 
Com. Code Ann. § 2.718 (2009); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9A § 2-718 (2010); Va. Code Ann. 
8.2-718 (2010); Wash. Rev. Code § 62A.2-718 (2010); W.Va. Code § 46-2-718 (2010); 
Wis. Stat. § 402.718 (2010); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34.1-2-718 (2009). 
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unconscionability as if they were required by Section 339. See Reliance, 858 P.2d 1363 
(applied Section 339 but considered presence or absence of elements of 
unconscionability). Indeed, CRE took the position in the District Court that "analysis 
under Section 339 was merely a makeweight" and that Utah courts had in fact adopted 
the doctrine of unconscionability as the standard used to determine the enforceability of a 
liquidated damages provision. (R. 180.) Moreover, as the District Court acknowledged, 
Section 339 is somewhat internally inconsistent in that it requires proof both that 
anticipated damages are reasonable and that the very same damages are difficult to prove. 
(R.721.) 
Section 356 presents no such difficulty. Like Utah Co#e Ann. §70A-2-718(l) 
(1953), it requires that analysis of reasonableness taking into Consideration both "the 
anticipated or actual loss" and the difficulty of proof of loss. [Moreover, Section 356 is in 
harmony with Utah's long-established case law saying that "4n unconscionable and 
exorbitant recovery, bearing no reasonable relationship to the actual damages suffered," 
represents an unenforceable penalty. Perkins, 243 P.2d at 449. To date, Section 356 has 
been adopted as the standard for enforceability of liquidated damages provisions in 
Colorado, New Jersey, Iowa, Missouri, and Kentucky. Klinger v. Adams County Sch. 
Dist. No. 50, 130 P.3d 1027, 1034 (Colo. 2006); MetLife Capital Fin. Corp. v. 
Washington Ave. Assoc. L.P., 732 A.2d 493, 499 (N.J. 1999); City of Davenport v. Shery 
Corp., 674 N.W.2d 79, 85 (Iowa 2004); Valentine's, Inc. v. Ngo, 251 S.W.3d 352, 354 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2008); Mattingly Bridge Co., Inc. v. Holloway & Son Const. Co., 694 
S.W.2d 702, 704-05 (Ky. 1985). 
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Moreover, several other states, outside of the context of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, have adopted standards for the enforceability of liquidated damages provisions that 
are substantially similar to Section 356. See Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 
N.E.2d 250, 268 (111. 2006) (adopting standard similar to and favorably citing 
Section 356); St Hilaire & Assoc, Inc. v. Harbor Corp., 607 A.2d 905, 907 (Me. 1992) 
("The test is one of reasonableness: if such provisions reflect the anticipated or actual loss 
caused by the default and are not usurious or excessive so as to constitute a penalty, they 
will be enforced.5'); Berens & Tate, P.C v. Iron Mountain Info. Mgmt., Inc., 1A1 N.W.2d 
383, 387 (Neb. 2008) (liquidated damages enforceable only when damages are difficult to 
ascertain and the amount stipulated is either a reasonable estimate of prospective 
damages or is reasonably proportionate to actual damages caused by the breach); MetLife 
Capital Fin. Corp., 732 A.2d at 496 (N.J. 1999) (test of validity is whether a stipulated 
damages clause is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances); Highgate Assoc, 
Ltd. v. Merryfield, 597 A.2d 1280, 1282 (Vt. 1991) (same); Nearburg v. Yates Petroleum 
Corp., 943 P.2d 560, 566 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) ("A penalty is a term fixing unreasonably 
large liquidated damages and is ordinarily unenforceable on grounds of public policy 
because it goes beyond compensation into punishment."). 
Based on the foregoing, Utah should adopt Section 356 as the standard for 
enforceability of liquidated damages. Section 356 would not represent a substantial 
change to Utah law, as it simply restates the factors previously adopted in Utah cases in a 
manner that is abundantly more clear and concise. In addition, it will bring Utah 
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common law on liquidated damages into harmony with the standard adopted by the Utah 
legislature in Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-718(l) (1953). 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER CRE'S 
UNDISPUTED FAILURE TO MITIGATE ITS DAMAGES. 
It is well-established in Utah that "a landlord is obligated to" mitigate damages for 
the early termination of a lease by taking "such steps as would be expected of a 
reasonable landlord letting out a similar property in the same market conditions." Reid, 
776 P.2d at 907; see also Mahrnoodv. Ross, 1999 UT 104, <| 31, 990 P.2d 933 (u[U]nder 
the doctrine of avoidable consequences the nonbreaching party has an active duty to 
mitigate his damages, and he 'may not, either by action or inaction, aggravate the injury 
occasioned by the breach.'") (quoting Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass 'n v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 
64 (Utah 1981)). 
Because CRE, as a landlord, had an indisputable obligation to mitigate its 
damages, the District Court erred as a matter of law by failing to consider CRE's 
undisputed failure to mitigate its damages. (R. 723.) As the District Court held, "it is 
undisputed that CRE did nothing to assist in finding a new tenant other than refer 
inquiries to Comcast's agent." (R. 723.) The District Court then stated that because the 
Lease "specified that the building was to be occupied by TCI^  not just any commercial 
tenant," the court "would not speculate as to what CRE coul4 or should have done to 
secure another tenant." (R. 724). This statement is in error tuid does nothing to negate 
CRE's failure to mitigate or take into account that failure. CRE has not contended that 
the Lease required that the premises be occupied only by TCJ, and in fact has not sought 
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liquidated damages for the period that the building was occupied by a subtenant. (R. 
707-08.) CRE has never disputed that if a subtenant occupies the premises it is not 
entitled to liquidated damages for the period of subtenancy. 
CRE's failure to meet its obligation mitigate its damages by seeking a substitute 
tenant is also illustrative of the unenforceability of the liquidated damages provision in 
this case. The liquidated damages provision, which made the Property three times more 
valuable when vacant, provided a tremendous financial disincentive for CRE to mitigate 
its damages.10 Such a provision promotes the inefficient use of property, violates Utah 
law obligating a landlord to mitigate by finding an alternative tenant, and is contrary to 
good public policy. 
Given CRE's undisputed failure to mitigate, Comcast should have been given the 
opportunity to establish that CRE's failure to take actions on its own to locate a substitute 
tenant and thereby mitigate its own damages established that it had suffered no actual 
damages, or, at minimum, reduced the amount of damages to which CRE was entitled. 
See LeBaron & Assoc, Inc. v. Rebel Enters., Inc., 823 P.2d 479, 484 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) (mitigation, if proven, results in a reduction of damages to be awarded); John Call 
Eng'g, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 795 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("[T]he burden 
10
 This disincentive is not only contrary to Utah law as set forth in Re id, but 
creates a tremendous economic inefficiency—particularly in troubled economic times, 
with increasing rates of lease and mortgage default, and good tenants increasingly hard to 
come by, it makes no sense to permit a landlord to sit back and allow liquidated damages 
for a non-monetary breach to accrue against a tenant who has been current on rents for 
the entire duration of the Lease. 
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of proving plaintiff has not mitigated its damages and that its award should be 
correspondingly reduced is on defendant."). In this case, the district Court found a 
failure to mitigate, but completely failed to consider the consequences of that failure. 
This is contrary to law. Accordingly, the Court should reverse and remand with the 
instructions that Comcast be given the opportunity to establish the effect of CRE's lack of 
efforts to mitigate its damages. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Comcast respectfully requests this Court to reverse the 
District Court's judgment, declare the liquidated damages provision at issue in this case 
unenforceable as a matter of law, and remand this case for fuifther proceedings. 
DATED this 10th day of May 2010. 
*7Ulmony C. Kaye 
Matthew L. Moncur 
BALLARD SPAHR LLP 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant Comcast 
ofWtahll, Inc. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE 
INVESTMENT, L.C., 
Plaintiff^ 
VS, 
COMCAST OF UTAH n, INC. and JOHN 
DOES 1 through 10 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 040905266 CN 
Judge Scott M. Hadley 
SEP 1 5 2009 
This matter came on for hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment on March 
18, 2008. The court entered its order on the motions for summary judgment on October 10, 2008. The 
court entered its order on the remaining claims in this matter on October 10, 2008. On M a ^ ^ 2 0 0 9 , 
the court entered its order on the remaining claims in plaintifFs complaint. Based on these orders, it is 
hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
1. Pursuant to paragraph 9.02 of the lease, plaintiff is awarded liquidated damages from July 
17, 2001 through February 22,2006 in the amount of $1,739,612.50. 
JD29757693 pages: 2 0743 
2. Pursuant to paragraph 31(a) of the Lease, Plaintiff isf awarded interest on the liquidated 
damages in the amount of $2,008,540.64 and late fees of $8,400. 
3i. • Plaintiffs claims regarding alleged violations of Section 5.03 and 8.02 of the lease are 
hereby dismissed without prejudice. 
4. Pursuant to paragraph 30 of the Lease, plaintiff is awarded attorney's fees of $4,000. 
5. Plaintiff is awarded a total judgment of $3,760,553.14. 
6. Interest on the judgment shall be calculated pursuant to paragraph 31 (a) of the Lease, the 
pertinent part of which provides: 
If Tenant fails to pay, when the same is due and payable, any minimum , 
additional rent, or other sums required to be paid hereunder, such unpaid amounts 
shall bear interest from the due date thereof to the date of payment at the rate of 
one and three-quarters percent fl-3/4%} ner month... 
DATED this /£_ day ofj^^. 2009 
Scott M. Hadley 
District Court Judge 
APBROVHD AS TO FORM 
CRE v. Comcast 
Judgment 
Page 2 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH S c: 
: J-i 
COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE / DECISION £ % 
Tl o INVESTMENT, L.C., / 
Plaintiff, *# g 
/ 
vs. 
/ Case No. 040905266 CN 
COMCAST OF UTAH H, INC., and Judge Scott M. Hadley 
JOHN DOES 1 through 10, / 
Defendants. 
APR 1 6 2008 
This case is before the Court on cross motions for partial summary judgment on the issue 
of whether the liquidated damages clause in the parties' lease is enforceable. At the outset, the 
Court wishes to express its appreciation to counsel for the manner in which the case was 
presented. The arguments on both side were direct and cogent, and the presentation of the 
pleadings (particularly the notebook containing the relevant case law) was exemplary. 
Regardless of the outcome, both parties should know that they have been well represented. 
I. FACTS 
The Court finds that the following facts are undisputed: 
1. Plaintiff ["CRE"] is a Utah limited liability company in the business of developing 
real estate in northern Utah. CRE is the owner of real property located at 5125 South 1500 West, 
Riverdale, Utah [the "Property"]. The Property consists of a commercial office building, which 
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is approximately 30,000 square feet, and an associated parking arid yard area. CRE developed 
the property for the specific purpose of leasing it. 
2. CRE's loan commitment for construction of the p _ r irty was $1,850,000.00, to be 
repaid over 15 years with monthly amortized payments of $17,679.57. Other than this loan, CRE 
has presented no other evidence concerning development costs for the Property. 
3. In 1995, TCI Cablevision of Utah ('TCP) approacned CRE about developing a ' 
large commercial building ("the TCI Building") where TCI could operate its northern Utah cable 
television business. The TCI Building was intended to encompass a customer service center, a 
call center, a depot from which TCI could dispatch its fleet of maintenance and installation 
vehicles, and facilities for TCP s other business operations in northern Utah. TCFs proposal was 
that it would find a site in Weber County where it wanted to establish the TCI Building and 
design a building for the site which would meet TCFs specific needs. TCI also proposed that if 
CRE would purchase the desired site, and construct the TCI Building on the site to TCFs 
specifications, TCI would enter into a long-term lease on the site and the TCI Building. 
4. CRE was willing to entertain TCFs proposal and Jhe parties commenced 
discussions about an agreement. 
5. TCI chose a site for the proposed building (the Property), and the site was 
reviewed and accepted by CRE. 
6. The proposed site was a lot in a large commercial! and industrial subdivision near 
Riverdale Road and 1-15. Most of the other lots in the subdivision had not been built on. CRE 
anticipated that TCFs headquarters would drive additional development in the subdivision. CRE 
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could buy other lots in the subdivision and either sell them to businesses or create more lease 
arrangements similar to CRE's arrangement with TCI. In order to take advantage of the 
development which CRE anticipated, it obtained another lot adjacent to the TCI lot. CRE did not 
express its intentions regarding adjacent development to TCI. 
7. TCFs agent prepared a commercial lease and delivered the lease to CRE. The 
lease TCI prepared contained virtually all of the terms which were included in the final signed 
lease between the parties. The draft lease had blanks for the rental amounts and the term of the 
lease, because the parties had not yet reached an agreement regarding these provisions. 
8. The draft lease that TCI prepared and sent to CRE contained a provision requiring 
TCI to operate its business in the building continuously for the t^ rm of the lease. The draft lease 
I 
also included a term regarding liquidated damages which TCI would have to pay each day that it 
did not operate its business at the site. These liquidated damages were set at an amount equal to 
the base rental which would be due for each day that TCI did not operate its business from the 
site. 
9. CRE reviewed the terms which were contained in the draft lease and approved 
them. The lease, which was executed on July 17, 1995, was for a fifteen-year term with rental 
amounts which would escalate every five years. For the first five years of the lease, the rental 
amount was $10.79 per square foot. The monthly rent for the site for this period was $26,975. 
For years six through ten of the lease, the rental amount would be $12.21 per square foot, which 
created a monthly rental of $30,535. In years eleven through fifteen, the rent was $13.74 per 
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month or a monthly rental of $34,350. Rent was not based on a percentage of TCFs sales or 
profits. The total rent to be paid over the term of the lease is $5,510,000.00. 
10. The executed lease was substantially identical to the draft lease which TCI had 
originally sent to CRE. The only additions were that the rental amounts and the term had been 
added. In all other respects, the final lease contained the same provisions as TCFs draft lease. 
11. The lease contained the following pertinent terms| 
a. TCI agreed "to operate all of the Building continuously during the entire 
term of this Lease with due diligence and efficiency." TCI was to keep 
sufficient personnel at the Building to conduct its business "at all times." 
fl[9.01); and 
b. As liquidated damages for the failure of Tenant to comply with the terms 
of this Article and in addition to all other remedies Landlord may have 
hereunder, Landlord shall have the right, as its option, to collect not only 
the minimum and additional rent herein provided, but added rent at the 
rate of one-thirtieth (l/30th) of the minimum monthly rent set forth in 
Article 4 for each and every day that Tenant shall fails [sic] to conduct its 
business as required herein.( f9.02.) 
22. Both of these terms were drafted and proposed by TCI and accepted by CRE. 
23. After the commencement of the lease, TCI took possession of the building and 
began operating from the building. 
24. On or about July 17, 2001, TCI ceased operations at the site. 
25. In 2002, Comcast acquired TCI and succeeded to TCI's interest in the Property 
and the lease and to its obligations under the terms of the lease. Comcast listed the building with 
a realtor in an effort to locate a replacement tenant. CRE referred any inquiries regarding the 
Property to Comcast's real estate agent, but CRE made no other efforts to find a substitute tenant. 
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A substitute tenant was finally found and took possession of the Property pursuant to a sublease 
dated February 22, 2006. 
26. Comcast and TCI have paid all rent due under the Lease since its inception, but 
have refused to pay liquidated damages. Liquidated damages from July 17, 2001, through 
February 22, 2006, would total $1,711,990.06. 
27. After TCI ceased its operations, interest in the rest of the commercial development 
waned and CRE sold its other lot in the subdivision. To date, no other lots in the development 
have been developed. 
The Court finds that the following facts are disputed, but need not be resolved for 
purposes of this motion: 
1. CRE has submitted an appraisal estimating that the difference in value to the 
property based on TCI's failure to occupy is $680,000. 
2. Comcast has submitted an appraisal indicating that CRE's damages, if any, would 
be no greater than $ 120,000. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. LEGAL STANDARD 
The parties disagree as to whether the Court should decide the issue based on an 
unconscionability analysis or under the provisions of § 339 of the Restatement of Contracts. 
Under Reliance Ins. Co. v. Utah Department of Transportation. 858 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1993), the 
Restatement clearly controls. The Court begins with the presumption that the contract is 
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enforceable as drafted. Warner v. Rasmussen. 704 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah 1985). This presumption 
is then examined to determine if: 
(a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm that 
is caused by the breach; and 
(b) the harm that is caused by the breach is one that is incapable or very difficult of 
accurate estimation. 
Reliance, 858 P.2d at 1367 (quoting Restatement of Contracts § 339 (1932)). 
It is the burden of the party opposing enforceability of the contract to overcome the 
presumption of validity. Bair v. Axion Design. LLC. 2001 UT 20, % 25, 20 P.3d 338. If either 
prong of the test is not met, the agreement is not enforceable. Woodhaven Apartments v. 
Washington, 942 P.2d 918, 921 (Utah 1997). 
The Court recognizes at the outset that the two-pronged test presents somewhat of a 
Hobson's choice. As the Supreme Court of Montana wrote in Arrowhead School Dist. v. Klyap. 
318 Mont. 103,125, 79 P.3d 250 (2003), "Hence, the question of reasonableness becomes 
somewhat circular and subjective: how can one meet a burden of proof to demonstrate 
anticipated damages are reasonable and yet difficult and impractical to prove at the same time?" 
The difficulty is compounded by the requirement that the parties consider the question as 
of the time of the inception of the agreement, rather than the time of the breach. "In determining 
whether the liquidated damages are excessive, this court will not look back with twenty-twenty 
hindsight after the breach has occurred. Instead, we will examine the [agreement] looking 
forward from the time of formation." Reliance. 858 P.2d at 1367. 
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Thus, it is with full comprehension of the gravity of its task that the Court undertakes the 
application of the Restatement test to the facts of the case at bar. 
B. REASONABLE FORECAST OF DAMAGES 
The evidence regarding the actual damages suffered by CRE is in dispute. CRE's 
estimate is $680,000; Comcast's indicates that damages are at most $120,000 and may well be 
nothing. Comcast also suggests that there is no evidence to causally link any alleged diminution 
in value to the failure to occupy the building; this is not a case of post hoc ergo propter hoc 
wherein one may assume that one event caused another merely because it occurred first. Setting 
aside the issue of causation, CRE offers no real argument as to how a liquidated damages 
provision that would result in an award of almost $1.8 million, which is approximately 2.65 
times the actual damages even if CRE's estimate of $680,000 were accepted. Comcast argues 
that this disparity alone is enough to find that the liquidated damages are a penalty. 
The issue is not as simplistic as merely comparing the numbers and determining whether 
they fall into an acceptable ratio. The Supreme Court cautioned against this approach in 
Reliance, noting, "[N]o precise mathematical formula exists for determining when liquidated 
damages are reasonably proportionate to the contract price.'* 858 P.2d at 1368 (citing Ledbetter 
Bros, v. North Carolina Department of Transportation. 68 N.C. App. 97, 106-07, 314 S.E.2d 761, 
768 (1984)). Moreover, even a significant disparity does not alone compel the conclusion that 
the liquidated damages provision was not a reasonable forecast of actual damages. If actual 
damages are reasonably related to liquidated damages, this evidence may be persuasive to the 
court, but the disparity must be "grossly excessive" such that it "shocks the conscience" before a 
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liquidated damages provision may be voided on this basis. Reliance, 858 P.2d at 1367 (quoting 
Allen v. Kingdon. 723 P.2d 394. 397 (Utah 1986)V 
The true gravaman of this analysis must be whether the parties were attempting in good 
faith to arrive at a fair way to determine what actual damages might be. If so, "it makes no 
difference whether this arrangement turns out to be too much or too little." Id (citations 
omitted). The Court has been presented no evidence as to why a liquidated damages provision 
was included or specifically what damages it was intended to redress. The clause itself is devoid 
of any indication that would be helpful as to its purpose or scope. 
CRE argues that it relied on the promise that the building would be occupied by TCI and 
that in reliance on this provision it purchased adjacent property and anticipated further 
development of the area. Comcast counters, and correctly, that none of these intentions were 
expressed during negotiations, and they certainly were not contained in the written agreement. 
However, it is plain that the parties must have anticipated some damages because otherwise there 
would be no reason for a liquidated damages provision to be included. 
The deciding factor for the Court in this case is that the amount of damages varied 
depending on the length of time the building was unoccupied. As the Arrowhead court pointed 
out, an indicator of reasonableness is "whether the clause provides for the same damages without 
regard to the materiality of the breach or whether the clause penalizes a mere delay in payment." 
Arrowhead. 318 Mont. 103 at Tf 30. The Court found the language of the Seventh Circuit on this 
issue instructive: 
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The element common to most liquidated damages clauses that get struck down 
as penalty clauses is that they specify the same damages regardless of the severity 
of the breach One can see the problem: if a contract provides that breaches of 
different gravity shall be sanctioned with equal severity, it is highly 
likely that the sanction specified for the mildest breach is a penalty (that, or the 
sanctions for all the other possible breaches must be inadequate). 
XCO International Inc. v. Pacific Scientific Co.. 369 F.3d 998,1004 (7th Cir. 2004) (citations 
omitted). 
Similar to the contract in XCO and the contract in Reliance, the CRE-Comcast agreement 
specified damages proportional to the length of the breach. The longer that Comcast breached 
the agreement, the greater the damages would be, thus rendering the amount of damages entirely 
within Comcast's control. For this reason, the Court cannot find that Comcast has met its burden 
of establishing that the liquidated damages were not a reasonable forecast of actual damages. 
To digress briefly from this issue, the Court notes that Comcast argued CRE is not 
entitled to any damages because CRE failed to mitigate its loss. It is undisputed that CRE did 
nothing to assist in finding a new tenant other than refer inquiries to Comcast's agent. The Court 
finds this argument is without merit because the contract specified that the building was to be 
occupied by TCI, not just any commercial tenant. There is no evidence as to why TCI vacated 
the building or how CRE could have prevented its departure. Where the contract specified 
particularly that TCI was to occupy the building, the Court will not speculate as to what CRE 
could or should have done to secure another tenant or whether any other tenant would satisfy the 
requirement of occupancy. 
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C. DIFFICULTY OF ESTIMATING DAMAGES 
The parties have offered the Court little guidance on this issue. As the contract does not 
state what type of damages were anticipated, it is puzzling to attempt to determine whether it was 
possible to reach an accurate estimate of damages that were hypothetical at the time of the 
contract formation. Comcast cites Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446 (Utah 1952) in support of 
the proposition that damages could easily have been calculated. The facts of Perkins hold little 
application, as the real estate contract in that case presented a loss easily measured by the decline 
of the real estate market over a relatively short period of time. It was also of significance to the 
Perkins court that the contract in question was a printed uniform real estate contract that afforded 
the Perkinses no bargaining leeway. As the court noted, "The construction of such a provision in 
a contract depends upon an interpretation of the whole instrument in the light of all of the 
circumstances surrounding the transaction." Id at p. 447. 
It is in this context that the issue of unconscionability bears relevance. CRE is correct 
that while the Supreme Court has expressly adopted the test of Restatement § 339, the cases 
discussing liquidated damages uniformly contain language applying an unconscionability 
analysis. 
The Court did so in Reliance, finding that there was no evidence to suggest that the 
court's judgment should be substituted for that of the contracting parties: 
The educated estimate of two professional participants experienced in contract 
formation will usually arrive at a more reasonable figure than that formulated by 
either the trial or the appellate court. The contracting parties were not in 
substantially disparate bargaining positions There is no evidence of 
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unfairness in the negotiating process, and this construction contract was 
awarded at arm's length. 
Reliance. 858 P.2d at 1369-70 (citation omitted). 
Similar to the parties in Reliance, the parties here are commercial entities, both 
experienced and capable of negotiating. Further, it was TCI that proposed the liquidated 
damages provision; CRE merely accepted the provision unchanged. It is this factor that is 
decisive. There were no elements of unconscionability present, ind it was Comcast's 
predecessor in interest that proposed that this provision was an appropriate remedy. It would not 
be appropriate for Comcast, having received the benefit of its bargain, to be relieved of an 
obligation that it not only voluntarily assumed, but that it proposed in the first place. 
III. CONCLUSION 
This is a case in which, as the Ninth Circuit put it, "[t]he court must decline to substitute 
the requirements of judicial proof for the parties' own conclusion." C & H Sugar Co. v. Sun 
Ship. Inc.. 794 F.2d 1433, 1439 (9th Cir. 1986). The area of liquidated damages is certainly 
fraught with risk. The parties estimate as best they can what damages are possible in the event of 
a breach that may or may not occur. A liquidated damages clause "can spare the parties and the 
court the anxiety and expense of protracted and uncertainty remddy proceedings." XCO. 369 
F.3d at 1003-04. 
As with any gamble, when one party loses, it is not unexpected that the court will be 
asked to equalize the parties' positions and ensure that no one receives a windfall or is unfairly 
penalized. It is this Court's conclusion that to do so in these circumstances would be to 
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reallocate the assumption of the risk that was bargained for between the parties. It is hornbook 
contract law that parties negotiating at arm's length and in good faith may agree as they please. 
"Courts don't review the other provisions of contracts for reasonableness; why this one?" Id at 
1001. 
Comcast cannot establish that either element of Restatement § 339 is not met, nor can 
Comcast prove that the agreement is unconscionable. Therefore, Plaintiffs motion for partial 
summary adjudication is granted, and Defendant's motion is denied. 
Plaintiffs counsel is to prepare an order consistent with this decision. 
DATED this /£ day of April, 2008. 
HONORABLE SCOTT M. HADL^Y 
District Court Judge 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE 
INVESTMENT, L.C., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
i " • ' ' " i " i 
ORDER 
Case No.: 640905266 CN 
COMCAST OF UTAH II, INC, and JOHN 
DOES 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
Judge Scott M. Hadley 
The parties' cross-motions for partial summary judgment ("Motions") came on for 
hearing before the Court, the Honorable Scott M. Hadley, on March 18,2008 at 3:00 p.m. 
Plaintiff, Commercial Real Estate Investment, L.C. ("CRE") was represented by Keith M. 
Backman and Richard W. Jones. Defendant, Comcast of Utah II, Inc. ("Comcast**) was 
represented by Jason D. Boren and Matthew L. Moncur. Based upon the Motions, the 
memoranda and other pleadings and papers filed in support thereof and in opposition thereto, 
argument of counsel, and good cause appearing IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED as follows: ??J!M^^fLT?^ms KAY ANO BOREN ON RET* 
Vp274078S2 pages: 13 
Commercial Real Estate Investment v. Com 
Civil No. 040905266 
I. UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The Court finds that the following facts are undisputed; 
1. CRE is a Utah limited liability company in the business of developing real estate 
in northern Utah; CRE is the owner of real property located at 5125 South 1500 West, 
Riverdale, Utah [the "Property"], The Property consists of a commercial office building, which 
is approximately 30,000 square feet, and an associated parking and yard area, CRE developed 
the property for the specific purpose of leasing it. 
2. CRE's loan commitment for construction of the property was $1,850,000.00, to 
be repaid over 15 years with monthly amortized payments of $17,^79.57. Other than this loan, 
CRE has presented no other evidence concerning development costs for the Property, 
3. In 1995, TCI Cablevision of Utah ("TCI") approached CRE about developing a 
large commercial building ("the TCI Building") where TCI could operate its northern Utah cable 
television business. The TCI Building was intended to encompass a customer service center, a 
call center, a depot from which TCI could dispatch its fleet of maintenance and installation 
vehicles, and facilities for TCI' s other business operations in northern Utah. TCI's proposal was 
that it would find a site in Weber County where it wanted to establish the TCI Building and 
design a building for the site which would meet TCI's specific needs. TCI also proposed that if 
CRE would purchase the desired site, and construct the TCI Building on the site to TCI's 
specifications, TCI would enter into a long-term lease on the site and the TCI Building. 
4. CRE was willing to entertain TCI's proposal and the parties commenced 
discussions about an agreement. 
5. TCI chose a site for the proposed building (the Property), and the site was 
reviewed and accepted by CRE. 
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6. The proposed site was a lot in a large commercial and industrial subdivision near 
Riverdale Road and I-15. Most of the other lots in the subdivision had not been built on. CRE 
anticipated that TCFs headquarters would drive additional development in the subdivision. CRE 
could buy other lots in the subdivision and either sell them to businesses or create more lease 
arrangements similar to CRE's arrangement with TCI. In order to take advantage of the 
development which CRE anticipated, it obtained another lot adjacent to the TCI lot. CRE did not 
express its intentions regarding adjacent development to TCI. 
7. TCI's agent prepared a commercial lease and delivered the lease to CRE. The 
lease TCI prepared contained virtually all of the terms which were included in the final signed 
lease between the parties. The draft lease had blanks for the rental amounts and the term of the 
lease, because the parties had not yet reached an agreement regarding these provisions. 
8. The draft lease that TCI prepared and sent to CRE contained a provision requiring 
TCI to operate its business in the building continuously for the term of the lease. The draft lease 
also included a term regarding liquidated damages which TCI would have to pay each day that it 
did not operate its business at the site. These liquidated damages were set at an amount equal to 
the base rental which would be due for each day that TCI did not operate its business from the 
site. 
9. CRE reviewed the terms which were contained in the draft lease and approved 
them. The lease, which was executed on July 17,1995, was for a fifteen-year term with rental 
amounts which would escalate every five years. For the first five years of the lease, the rental 
amount was $10.79 per square foot. The monthly rent for the site for this period was $26,975. 
For years six through ten of the lease, the rental amount would be $12.21 per square foot, which 
created a monthly rental of $30,535. In years eleven through fifteen, the rent was $13.74 per 
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month or a monthly rental of $34,350. Rent was not based on a percentage of TCI's sales or 
profits. The total rent to be paid over the term of the lease is $5,510,000.00. 
10. The executed lease was substantially identical to the draft lease which TCI had 
originally sent to CRE. The only additions were that the rental amounts and the term had been 
added. In all other respects, the final lease contained the same prp*"cions as TCPs draft lease. 
11. The lease contained the following pertinent terms: 
a. TCI agreed "to operate all of the Building continuously during the 
entire term of this Lease with due diligence and efficiency." TCI was to 
keep sufficient personnel at the Building to conduct its business "at all 
times." (f9.01); and 
b. As liquidated damages for the failure of Tenant to comply with the 
terms of this Article and in addition to all other remedies Landlord may 
have hereunder, Landlord shall have the right, as its option, to collect not 
only the minimum and additional rent herein provided, but added rent at 
the rate of one-thirtieth (l/30lh) of the minimum monthly rent set forth in 
Article 4 for each and every day that Tenant shall fails [sic] to conduct its 
business as required herein. flf9.02.) 
12. Both of these terms were drafted and proposed by TCI and accepted by CRE. 
13. After the commencement of the lease, TCI took possession of the building and 
began operating from the building. 
14. On or about July 17,2001, TCI ceased operations at the site. 
15. In 2002, Comcast acquired TCI and succeeded to TCPs interest in the Property 
and the lease and to its obligations under the terms of the lease. Comcast listed the building with 
a realtor in an effort to locate a replacement tenant. CRE referred any inquiries regarding the 
Property to Comcast's real estate agent, but CRE made no other efforts to find a substitute 
tenant A substitute tenant was finally found and took possession qf the Property pursuant to a 
sublease dated February 22,2006. 
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16. Comcast and TCI have paid all rent due under the Lease since its inception, but 
have refused to pay liquidated damages. Liquidated damages from July 17, 2001, through 
February 22,2006, would total $1,711,990.06. 
17. After TCI ceased its operations, interest in the rest df the commercial 
development waned and CRE sold its other lot in the subdivision. To date, no other lots in the 
development have been developed. 
H. 
The Court finds that the following facts are disputed, but need not be resolved for 
purposes of this motion: 
1. CRE has submitted an appraisal estimating that the difference in value to the 
property based on TCTs failure to occupy is $680,000. 
2. Comcast has submitted an appraisal indicating that CRE's damages, if any, would 
be no greater than $ 120,000. 
m. 
Having determined that there are no genuine disputes as to any material fact, it is 
therefore ORDERED as follows: 
1. The parties disagree as to whether the Court should decide the issue based on an 
unconscionability analysis or under the provisions of § 339 of the Restatement of Contracts. 
Under Reliance Ins, Co, v. Utah Department of Transportation, 85^P.2d 1363 (Utah 1993), the 
Restatement clearly controls. The Court begins with the presumption that the contract is 
enforceable as drafted. Warner v. Rasmussen, 704 P.2d 559, 561 (ptah 1985). This presumption 
is then examined to determine if: 
a. the amount so fixed is a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the 
harm that is caused by the breach; and 
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b. the harm that is caused by the breach is one that is incapable or very 
difficult of accurate estimation. 
2. It is the burden of the party opposing enforceability of the contract to overcome 
the presumption of validity. Bair v. Axion Design, LLC, 2001 UT 20, f 25, 20 P.3d 338. If 
either prong of the test is not met, the agreement is not enforceable^ Woodhaven Apartments v. 
Washington, 942P.2d 918, 921 (Utah 1997). 
3. The Court recognizes at the outset that the two-pronged test presents somewhat of 
a Hobson's choice. As the Supreme Court of Montana wrote in Arrowhead School Dist. v. 
Klyap, 318 Mont 103, \ 25, 79 P.3d 250 (2003), "Hence, the question of reasonableness 
becomes somewhat circular and subjective: how can one meet a burden of proof to demonstrate 
anticipated damages are reasonable and yet difficult and impractical to prove at the same time?" 
4. The difficulty is compounded by the requirement th t^ the parties consider the 
question as of the time of the inception of the agreement, rather thap the time of the breach. "In 
determining whether the liquidated damages are excessive, this court will not look back with 
twenty-twenty hindsight after the breach has occurred. Instead, we! will examine the [agreement] 
looking forward from the time of formation." Reliance, 858 P.2d at 1367. 
5. The evidence regarding the actual damages suffered by CRE is in dispute. CRE's 
estimate is $680,000; Comcast's indicates that damages are at most $120,000 and may well be 
nothing. Comcast also suggests that there is no evidence to causally link any alleged diminution 
in value to the failure to occupy the building; this is not a case of post hoc ergo propter hoc 
wherein one may assume that one event caused another merely because it occurred first. Setting 
aside the issue of causation, CRE offers no real argument as to how a liquidated damages 
provision that would result in an award of almost $1.8 million, which is approximately 2.65 
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times the actual damages even if CRFs estimate of $680,000 were accepted. Comcast argues 
that this disparity alone is enough to find that the liquidated damages are a penalty. 
6. The issue is not as simplistic as merely comparing the numbers and determining 
whether they fall into an acceptable ratio. The Supreme Court cautioned against this approach in 
Reliance, noting, u[N]o precise mathematical formula exists for determining when liquidated 
damages are reasonably proportionate to the contract price." 858 P.2d at 1368 (citing Ledbetter 
Bros, v. North Carolina Department of Transportation, 68 N.C. App. 97,106-07, 314 S.E.2d 
761, 768 (1984)). Moreover, even a significant disparity does not alone compel the conclusion 
that the liquidated damages provision was not a reasonable forecast of actual damages. If actual 
damages are reasonably related to liquidated damages, this evidence may be persuasive to the 
court, but the disparity must be "grossly excessive" such that it "shocks the conscience" before a 
liquidated damages provision may be voided on this basis. Reliance, 858 P.2d at 1367 (quoting 
Allen v. Kingdon, 723 P.2d 394, 397 (Utah 1986)). 
7. The true gravamen of this analysis must be whether the parties were attempting in 
good faith to arrive at a fair way to determine what actual damages might be. If so, "it makes no 
difference whether this arrangement turns out to be too much or too little." Id. (citations 
omitted). The Court has been presented no evidence as to why a liquidated damages provision 
was included or specifically what damages it was intended to redress. The clause itself is devoid 
of any indication that would be helpful as to its purpose or scope. 
8. CRE argues that it relied on the promise that the building would be occupied by 
TCI and that in reliance on this provision it purchased adjacent property and anticipated further 
development of the area. Comcast counters, and correctly, that none of these intentions were 
expressed during negotiations, and they certainly were not contained in the written agreement. 
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However, it is plain that the parties must have anticipated some damages because otherwise there 
would be no reason for a liquidated damages provision to be included. 
9. The deciding factor for the Court in this case is that the amount of damages varied 
depending on the length of time the building was unoccupied. As the Arrowhead court pointed 
out, an indicator of reasonableness is "whether the clause provides for the same damages without 
regard to the materiality of the breach or whether the clause penalizes a mere delay in payment." 
Arrowhead, 318 Mont. 103 at f 30. The Court found the language of the Seventh Circuit on this 
issue instructive: 
The element common to most liquidated damages clauses that get 
struck down as penalty clauses is that they specify the same 
damages regardless of the severity of the breach One can see 
the problem: if a contract provides that breaches of different 
gravity shall be sanctioned with equal severity, it is highly likely 
that the sanction specified for the mildest breach is a penalty (that, 
or the sanctions for all the other possible breaches must be 
inadequate). 
XCO International Inc. v. Pacific Scientific Co., 369 F.3d 998,1004 (7th Cir. 2004) (citations 
omitted). 
10. Similar to the contract in XCO and the contract in Reliance, the CRE-Comcast 
agreement specified damages proportional to the length of the breach. The longer that Comcast 
breached the agreement, the greater the damages would be, thus rendering the amount of 
damages entirely within Comcast's control. For this reason, the Court cannot find that Comcast 
has met its burden of establishing that the liquidated damages were not a reasonable forecast of 
actual damages. 
11. To digress briefly from this issue, the Court notes that Comcast argued CRE is not 
entitled to any damages because CRE failed to mitigate its loss. It is undisputed that CRE did 
nothing to assist in finding a new tenant other than refer inquiries to Comcast's agent. The Court 
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finds this argument is without merit because the contract specified that the building was to be 
occupied by TCI, not just any commercial tenant. There is no evidence as to why TCI vacated 
the building or how CRE could have prevented its departure. Where the contract specified 
particularly that TCI was to occupy the building, the Court will not speculate as to what CRE 
could or should have done to secure another tenant or whether any other tenant would satisfy the 
requirement of occupancy. 
12, The parties have offered the Court little guidance on this issue. As the contract 
does not state what type of damages were anticipated, it is puzzling to attempt to determine 
whether it was possible to reach an accurate estimate of damages that were hypothetical at the 
time of the contract formation. Comcast cites Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446 (Utah 1952) in 
support of the proposition that damages could easily have been calculated. The facts of Perkins 
hold little application, as the real estate contract in that case presented a loss easily measured by 
the decline of the real estate market over a relatively short period of time. It was also of 
significance to the Perkins court that the contract in question was a printed uniform real estate 
contract that afforded the Perkinses no bargaining leeway. As the court noted, "The construction 
of such a provision in a contract depends upon an interpretation of the whole instrument in the 
light of all of the circumstances surrounding the transaction." Id. at p. 447. 
13. It is in this context that the issue of unconscionability bears relevance. CRE is 
correct that while the Supreme Court has expressly adopted the test of Restatement § 339, the 
cases discussing liquidated damages uniformly contain language applying an unconscionability 
analysis. The Court did so in Reliance, finding that there was no evidence to suggest that the 
courts judgment should be substituted for that of the contracting parties; 
The educated estimate of two professional participants experienced 
in contract formation will usually arrive at a more reasonable 
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figure than that formulated by either the trial or the appellate court. 
The contracting parties were not in substantially disparate 
bargaining positions There is no evidence of unfairness in the 
negotiating process, and this construction contract was awarded at 
arm's length. 
Reliance, 858 P.2d at 1369-70 (citation omitted). 
14. Similar to the parties in Reliance, the parties here are communal entities, both 
experienced and capable of negotiating. Further, it was TCI that proposed the liquidated 
damages provision; CRE merely accepted the provision unchanged. It is this factor that is 
decisive. There were no elements of unconscionability present, and it was Comcast's 
predecessor in interest that proposed that this provision was an appropriate remedy. It would not 
be appropriate for Comcast, having received the benefit of its bargain, to be relieved of an 
obligation that it not only voluntarily assumed, but that it proposed in the first place. 
15. This is a case in which, as the Ninth Circuit put it, "[t]he court must decline to 
substitute the requirements of judicial proof for the parties' own conclusion." C & HSugar Co. 
v. Sun Ship, Inc., 794 F.2d 1433,1439 (9th Cir. 1986). The area of liquidated damages is 
certainly fraught with risk. The parties estimate as best they can what damages are possible in 
the event of a breach that may or may not occur. A liquidated damages clause "can spare the 
parties and the court the anxiety and expense of protracted and uncertainty remedy proceedings." 
XCO, 369 F.3d at 1003-04. 
16. As with any gamble, when one party loses, it is not unexpected that the court will 
be asked to equalize the parties' positions and ensure that no one receives a windfall or is 
unfairly penalized It is this Court's conclusion that to do so in these circumstances would be to 
reallocate the assumption of the risk that was bargained for between the parties. It is hornbook 
contract law that parties negotiating at arm's length and in good faith may agree as they please. 
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"Courts don't review the other provisions of contracts for reasonableness; why this one?" Id. at 
1001. 
17. Comcast cannot establish that either element of Restatement § 339 is not met, nor 
can Comcast prove that the agreement is unconscionable. Therefore, Plaintiffs motion for 
partial summary adjudication is granted, and Defendant's motion is denied. 
rktr Cturtb Afrtl lt,Aoot Psdsio* is Incoffora^Ji^o ik\s 0+&* by rePe*e«ce. 
18. Plaintiffs counsel is to prepare an ordor consistent with this decision, &##. 
DATED this j £ day of faae, 2008. 
HONORABLE SCOTT M. 
District Court Judge 
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Richard W. Jones 
Keith M. Backman 
Helgesen, Waterfall & Jones, P.C. 
Centennial Bank Building 
4605 Harrison Boulevard, 3rd Floor, 
Ogden,UT 84403 
Anthony C. Kaye 
Jason D. Boren 
Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP 
One Utah Center, Suite 800, 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2221 
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